Old Dominion University

ODU Digital Commons
Management Faculty Publications

Department of Management

12-1-2019

The Relocation of Supply Chains from China and the Impact on
the Chinese Economy
Shaomin Li
Old Dominion University, sli@odu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/management_fac_pubs
Part of the Chinese Studies Commons, International Business Commons, and the Operations and
Supply Chain Management Commons

Original Publication Citation
Li, S. (2019). The relocation of supply chains from China and the impact on the Chinese economy. China
Leadership Monitor. https://www.prcleader.org/shaomin-li

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Management at ODU Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Management Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator
of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.

The Relocation of Supply Chains from China and the Impact on the Chinese Economy
Shaomin Li
The U.S.-China trade war has had a huge impact on the supply chains in China,
accelerating their relocation that had already begun due to rising taxes, costs of labor, and
other input factors. The exodus reported in the past year is only the tip of the iceberg, as
more serious effects will not become apparent immediately. A major effect of the
relocation on China is job losses, which may reach as many as 5 million in the coming
years. Given the unlikeliness of a quick end to the trade war and the reluctance of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to make structural changes, the long-term prospects for
supply chains in China are not promising because not only will existing firms gradually
reduce their exposure to political and economic uncertainties, but also potential
newcomers are likely to avoid China. Although the CCP rolled out some policies that
may help alleviate the shock, it has yet to come up with specific policies to effectively
address the problem.

In early 2018, the Trump administration began to use tariffs as a weapon to pressure China to
reduce the trade deficit, starting what we know of today as the “trade war.” Since then, the
demands on China from the United States have evolved from balancing trade to making “needed
structural changes,” particularly in the areas of forced technology transfers, intellectual property
protection, non-tariff barriers, cyber intrusions and cyber theft of trade secrets, among others.1 In
August 2019, President Trump demanded that American companies “immediately start looking
for an alternative to China.”2
The trade war has greatly affected the political economy of China. Economically, it has
negatively affected the manufacturing sector, substantially reducing trade with the United States,
deterring foreign investments, disrupting supply chains, and accelerating the relocation of supply
chains from China. Here I will focus on how the relocation of supply chains from China affects
the Chinese economy.
The Relocation of Supply Chains from China
A “supply chain” refers to the network of firms involved in the production, transactions (such as
buying and selling), and transfer of goods from the beginning (such as sourcing the raw
materials) to the end (such as delivering the finished products to customers or other end-users).
In this article, I will focus on the production side of the supply chain.
There is little doubt that the U.S.-China trade war has had a fundamental impact on supply chains
in China, at an unprecedented scale and scope. A survey of press reports on firms relocating or
considering relocating from China between October 2018 and October 2019 records more than
50 firms, including Apple, Samsung, HP, Dell, Microsoft, Foxconn, Suzuki, and Fuyao Glass
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(whose much-covered expansion to Ohio was documented in the film American Factory). In
terms of country of origin, most of the firms are Japanese and American. In terms of target
countries, South Asia (Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, India, and Cambodia) are the most frequent
destination, followed by Mexico. Many Japanese firms returned home (see Table 1). These cases
are only those that are known; more importantly, when many of them leave, their suppliers or
clients may leave as well. For example, when Apple announced that it will relocate some of its
iPhone production from China, seven Taiwanese firms (known to have been Apple suppliers)
also relocated part of their production to avoid tariffs.3
According to a survey conducted by the American Chamber of Commerce, “More than 70
percent of U.S. firms operating in southern China are considering delaying further investment
there and moving some or all of their manufacturing to other countries as the trade war bites into
profits.” Furthermore, it is not only the foreign firms that are considering leaving China: “Half
of their Chinese counterparts share the same consideration.”4 In a survey conducted by Baker
McKenzie of 600 firms in the Asia-Pacific region, “93 percent of Chinese companies ‘were
considering making some change to their supply chains to mitigate the effects of trade tariffs,’
and ‘82 percent of respondents are changing their supply chains to counter the trade war.’”5
The trend of leaving or considering to leave is increasing with time. According to a managing
partner at AC Trade Advisory, Angelia Chew, many companies, “Have gone past the observation
stage and are now putting things into action.”6
Tim Cook, CEO of Apple, Inc., has stated: “We believe the economic environment in China has
been further impacted by rising trade tensions with the United States.” Arista Networks, Inc.
issued a statement in 2018 saying that, “With judicious planning by our manufacturing teams, we
are reducing our dependency on China-sourced components gradually and increasing our
manufacturing capacity outside China next year.”7 Kiyofumi Kakudo, CEO of PC maker
Dynabook, said that, “We need permanent measures to avoid the risk of tariffs. …”8
For Universal Electronics, its decision to relocate its manufacturing from China to Mexico was
driven by the rising labor costs in China: “Frankly, we have been preparing for this shift because
the increasing labor rates in China have made those labor rates less and less favorable over time
to those in other countries.”9
Based on the surveys, media reports, and other anecdotal evidence, it can be concluded that the
majority of manufacturing firms in China, including Chinese firms, are looking into the option of
relocating elsewhere at least part of their activities.
Reasons for the Relocation of Supply Chains from China
When companies select a location for their supply chains, they must consider the following
options: whether to keep most of their supply chains within a single country or to have parallel
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supply chains or different parts of a supply chain in different countries. Their selections are
based on country-, industry-, and firm-level factors.10
The country-level factors refer to a country’s macro environment that facilitates or constrains a
firm’s supply-chain operations. More specifically, the macro environment includes the following
factors: the political, legal, economic, and social (cultural) systems, input factors (cost of labor,
land, materials, and other inputs), trade barriers, exchange rates, and location externalities (which
arise from the concentration of related firms clustering in the same location, such as IT firms in
Silicon Valley).
The relocation of supply chains from China is primarily due to country-level factors, the most
important of which is the trade war, whose effects are multi-dimensional, including increased
tariffs and the high-level uncertainty and unpredictability that are salient features of the trade
war.
The first and most immediate factor is the increased tariffs. The first wave of tariffs (List 1 and 2
of $50 billion worth of goods, as reported by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative) had
the greatest impact on the following eight industries: (1) instruments and meters, (2) special
equipment, (3) railways, ships, aircraft, and other transportation equipment, (4) general
equipment, (5) electrical machinery and equipment, (6) computers, communications, and
electronic equipment, (7) rubber and plastic products, and (8) fabricated metal products. The
second wave of tariffs (List 3 of $200 billion worth of goods) added the following to those goods
that were seriously impacted: (1) furniture, (2) leather products and shoes, and (3) wood
products. The third wave (List 4 of $300 billion worth of goods), which is on hold, would add to:
(1) cultural, educational, art, sports, and recreational products, (2) garments and apparel, and (3)
textiles.11 All these industries heavily depend on exports to the United States. Table 1 shows that
most of the firms that are leaving are involved in IT products, electronics, computers, and auto
parts. The fact that auto and auto-part industries, which are less exposed to the U.S. market, are
also leaving and indicating a worsening performance12 suggests that the impact of the tariffs has
already reached industries focusing on the domestic market.
A second factor is the political economy of China, which is the most fundamental reason behind
the trade war. The most salient feature of the political economy of China is that the goal of the
Chinese Communist Party is to maintain party rule. Its policies toward business and foreign
firms vary depending on its priorities. For example, when capital and managerial knowledge
were needed during the early stages of the market reforms, the party gave preferential treatment
to foreign firms. When capital became more abundant and local firms acquired management
know-how, the earlier preferential policies to foreign firms became more discriminatory.13 In
such an environment, it is impossible for firms to project trends and plan accordingly because
party preferences change over time and party policy making is opaque. The fact that China lacks
impartially enforced laws is another factor prompting firms to relocate their supply chains. In
international business, companies tend to ask their home-country government to help them deal
with, or even to pressure, the host-country government if they want to improve the operations
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environment. This strategy is most effective if the home-country is bigger and more powerful
than the host country. In the case of China, given its size and its powerful government, few
home-country governments are able to deal effectively with the Chinese government. For fear of
retaliation, most home-country governments and firms avoid criticizing the Chinese
government.14
The effects of the political factors are strong in the case of changes in supply chains, which are
illustrated in the following examples. Due to the trade war, the Chinese government decided to
import pork from Russia instead of from the United States. In so doing , African swine fever, a
highly contagious and deadly virus, was brought into China from its northern neighbor,
drastically disrupting China’s supply chain of pork.15 Another example is the Chinese
government’s threat to use its market power with respect to the supply of rare earths as a weapon
in the trade war, which has spurred development of supply capabilities of rare earth by other
countries, eventually hurting the Chinese position.16
A third important factor that has led to the relocation of supply chains from China is the rising
costs of input factors, especially the rapid increase in labor costs. For example, between 2011
and 2016, the average hourly wages for factory workers rose from $2.20 to $3.60, a 64 percent
increase. This is on par with that in more developed countries such as Portugal, and five to seven
times higher than hourly wages in India and Sri Lanka.17 In addition to the rising labor costs,
other operational costs are rising as well. According to Cao Dewang, the famed chairman of
Fuyao Glass who opened a factory in Ohio, the high taxes and fees levied on firms in China were
a major consideration for his relocation.18 An article on why Chinese firms are relocating to the
United States cites that land, electricity, natural gas, and logistical costs are higher in China than
they are in the United States.19
The industry-level factors include the technologies that are used, and the type of products made
in each industry. In some industries, the fixed costs of setting up a production plant are very
high. This will favor centralizing production in one country in order to achieve economies of
scale to lower unit costs. Semiconductor manufacturing is one such example because it may
require up to $5 billion to set up a state-of-the-art semiconductor manufacturing facility.
Conversely, products that require relatively low levels of fixed costs for production, such as
garments, can be spread among different countries. Products that must be continuously produced
and have a low value-to-weight ratio, such as steel, also tend to be concentrated in one location.
The firm-level factors include the firm’s goals, strategies, and capabilities. Since our focus is on
the macro-level factors, we will not discuss the firm-level factors here.
The countervailing forces that may help China retain supply chains are (1) the high productivity
of Chinese workers, (2) the extensively developed infrastructure, and (3) the high level of
development in the manufacturing sector with respect to its value-added capabilities.20
The Effects of Relocations on the Chinese economy
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1. Effects on Employment
This is the issue that most concerns the Chinese government, as unemployment will directly
affect tens, if not hundreds, of millions of workers and may lead to social unrest.21 According a
report by two CICC (China International Capital Corp.) economists, since the first wave of tariffs
(on $50 billion worth of goods) by the United States in July 2018, total employment in the
Chinese manufacturing sector has declined by 5 million, which accounts for 0.7 percent of
China’s total employment and 3.4 percent of China’s manufacturing employment. It should be
noted that the job losses are not evenly distributed across all industries. The industries hardest hit
include electronics, special equipment, computers and equipment, rubber and plastic, general
equipment, measurement instruments, railways, ships, aircraft, other transportation equipment,
and metal products. The CICC report estimates that job losses in these most vulnerable industries
amount to between 1.3 and 1.9 million, or 0.9–1.2 percent of employment in the manufacturing
sector. Another assessment by an economist at Citigroup puts the near-term job losses in China
at 1.77 to 2.95 million, and the long-term job losses from 3 to as high as 5 million. If we assume
that the total number of unemployed people is about 9 million, as revealed by the available
statistics,22 then the 2 to 5 million jobs lost due to the relocation of supply chains will sharply
increase the unemployment rate in China during the next several years. The negative effects of
the relocation of supply chains from China due to the trade war will peak in 2020. For regions
and industries that are most seriously affected, such as the computer and communication
industries, and Guangdong and the coastal regions, the impact may be even worse.23 Job losses
may also be detected indirectly from the reduced consumption of electricity. In the first three
quarters of 2019, electricity generated by Beijixing Power Grid was 116,650 gigawatts, which is
45.4 percent lower than that in the previous year.24
Another important effect of the relocation on employment is the substantial reduction in
overtime work opportunities due to the reduction in orders. In the Chinese manufacturing sector,
overtime is an indispensable mechanism to maintain high productivity because by having
workers work overtime, a firm can more fully utilize its machines or assembly lines. This also
allows firms to reduce the total number of workers and therefore the firms can save on workers’
benefits as well as on overhead costs, even if the firm pays 1.5 times the ordinary pay for
overtime wages as required by the Chinese government. Two surveys report that more than 40
percent of the respondents worked overtime.25 As such, overtime pay was an important, regular
source of income for workers prior to the trade war. With the substantial reduction of overtime,
the productivity of firms was affected, and the incomes of workers were reduced.26
In Chinese society, there is widespread pessimism and fear about future economic prospects. A
post entitled “Top Economist’s Candid Advice for the Last Months of 2019,” which went viral
on Weibo and WeChat, suggested ten points of advice: 1.) hoard cash, buy gold, accumulate U.S.
dollars, and stockpile pork; 2.) do not quit your job, do not start a business, do not invest, do not
mortgage, and do not leverage; 3.) do not borrow, and, more importantly, do not lend to friends;
4.) eat at home, return to basic consumption, and do not be extravagant; 5.) stop all extramarital
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affairs; 6.) be humble and show respect for low-income people; 7.) sell your home, especially if
you have more than one; 8.) get married to reduce living expenses, but delay having children; 9.)
exercise and do not get sick; 10.) survive!27
2. Long-term and Structural Effects
Relocating supply chains takes time. Finding new locations is challenging as few countries can
match China in terms of size, skilled labor, infrastructure, and the number of capable firms.
Furthermore, many investments are sunk and cannot be recouped or transferred, such as good
relationships with local governments or factories or equipment that are custom-made to match
local specifications or requirements. This is why experts warn that the main effect of the
relocation of supply chains from China will not be revealed immediately and will only gradually
become obvious in the years to come. This delayed effect may be exacerbated by firms realizing
that U.S.-China trade frictions are a new normal. Firms that plan to set up supply chains will then
stay away from China. In sum, the long-term effects will be worse than the short-term effects.
For industries that require high fixed costs and large economies of scale, such as semiconductors, aircraft, or automobiles, relocation will take a longer time. Conversely, for industries
characterized by low fixed costs, a low minimum efficient scale, or flexible manufacturing
technology, moving is relatively easy. Suppliers of goods that have a high value-to-weight ratio
and serve universal (as opposed to custom-tailored) needs, such as standard electronic
components, are relatively easy to move. Thus, the exodus of makers and suppliers of electronic
components, as well as makers of consumer products, can be expected to occur sooner, whereas
the relocation of manufacturers that employ large assembly lines will take place later.
The relocation of supply chains will push China to accelerate its efforts to develop its own
supply chains.28 For example, Huawei is now forced to seek more domestic suppliers for its
smart phones due to the U.S. sanctions. The consequences of such an internalization of supply
chains by China will result in its future supply chains being less connected with the international
market.
Economist Jing Liang argues that the trade war and the relocation of supply chains will push the
Chinese economy into what he calls an ICU-economy. To secure its own survival, the party will
increase the pace of resource extractions from the private sector without providing policies or
resources for it to grow. This is like a sick old man in intensive care who depends on blood from
the young. Liang argues, however, that the IT capabilities of the Chinese state and help from the
outside world (as the outside world does not want to see the Chinese economy to collapse) may
contribute to sustaining the Chinese economy for a long time in its present state.29
Chinese Policies to Reverse these Trends
So far, the Chinese government has not announced any clear policies regarding the loss of supply
chains. It has taken measures that will help mitigate the effect of the trade war, and thus these
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measures can be viewed as indirect or implicit policies to stem the flight of firms. Below are the
major such policies.
A first and quick measure the government took was to devaluate the yuan to counter the decrease
in exports and foreign investments. Since early 2018, the exchange value of the yuan to the U.S.
dollar has dropped from about $6.30 per dollar to about $7.10 per dollar, or 11 percent.30 In
addition, the government has lowered the reserve requirement for banks and has increased
money supply to stimulate the economy.31 It has also made the buying and transfer of sending
foreign currencies more difficult so as to reduce capital flight.32 The devaluation of the yuan will
be effective to stimulate exports, but it also will hurts the buying power of Chinese firms and
Chinese residents. Similarly, lowering the reserve requirements will have its limits. Finally,
increasing the money supply may exacerbate China’s already serious debt issue.
Next, the government rolled out favorable policies and laws to pacify and attract foreign
investors. In 2019 the Chinese government published its “Foreign Investment Laws” and a series
of policies aimed at further lowering entry barriers and encouraging foreign investment to enter
the following industries: transportation, infrastructure, culture, manufacturing, mining, and
agriculture.33 The problem with such an approach is that the very success of the policy will be a
source of concern for potential investors because the powerful government can give all the green
lights required to jumpstart a project, only to then easily kill it by a simple administrative order.
By their nature, supply chain investments tend to be long-term, and, logically, investors prefer a
consistent political and economic environment with fair and effective protections for their
investments. Such an environment is not attainable under the current political system. As an
editorial on China’s intellectual property violations in The American Spectator underscores,
China’s rule over law instead of rule of law “is a major reason competitors are attempting to do
business elsewhere.”34
Another effort has been to expedite the development of 5G in China to counter the economic
slowdown caused by the loss of supply chains.35 According to Chinese media, the government
plans to invest up to one trillion yuan ($140 billion) in the development of the 5G network to
revitalize the economy.36 This strategy will likely spur some growth and related technology
advances. However, such a state-sponsored effort inevitably will lead to wasteful use of capital
and a premature retirement of the 4G network will cause major investment losses.
Further developing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may help compensate for the loss of
supply chains.37 The BRI may employ the excess capacities in infrastructure construction that
China accumulated during its boom years and it has potential strategic value for China’s global
expansion,38 but its help in mitigating the economic losses from the relocation of supply chains is
limited. It requires a huge cash investment, which may not be feasible since China’s domestic
economy is slowing down and needs cash injections. Furthermore, the BRI projects primarily
utilize construction capacities and thus cannot replace the loss in high-tech capacities that has
occurred due to the relocation of supply chains (nevertheless, the jobs generated by the BRI may
soften the blow for unskilled workers). Last, the BRI projects are subject to closer scrutiny by the
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host countries that usually demand that the BRI projects hire more local workers and generate
greater benefits for the host-country economy.
Other policy measures that might help absorb the shock of supply chain losses include the
campaign for “all to create startups and millions to innovate” (大众创业，万众创新)39 and the
“night economy” (夜间经济) campaign to stimulate consumption.40
1. The Refusal to Make Structural Changes Hurts China
While the Chinese government rejects demands from the United States to make structural
changes, such changes would help China develop its supply chain capability in the long run.
Simply put, the structural changes would change the CCP-run economy to a market economy
based on rule of law. In a study based on the use of trade data on how the political economy
affects trade flows , the authors show that if relation-based countries (countries that are corrupt
and have weak rule of law) embrace the rule of law and become rule-based (governed by fair
and transparent public rules that are impartially enforced), more countries will trade with them.41
China has made great gains in international trade and in becoming one of the largest hubs in
global supply chains, despite its relation-based system. If China can make a genuine effort to
embrace the rule of law and to create a more open and fair market, then instead of losing supply
chains, it will become a more desirable location, given its size, advanced infrastructure, and
productive labor force.
In conclusion, available data, reports. and analyses all indicate that the relocation of supply
chains from China due mainly to the trade war has already begun and in the future, it will likely
become worse. Many firms that have not yet made the decision to leave are now considering
their options. The effect of relocation on the Chinese economy will be significant and long term.
So far, the government has been taking measures to counter the economic slowdown caused by
the trade war. Whether these measures will effectively stem the loss of supply chains is yet to be
seen. There is no indication that the Chinese government is making structural reforms, even
though such reforms will be necessary for China’s long-term development of supply-chain
capabilities.
Table 1. List of Companies Leaving or Considering Leaving China
Firm
Country
Industry
of Origin
Amazon
U.S.
online retailer
Apple
U.S.
IT, new iPhones
Arista Networks, Inc.
U.S.
networking switches and other
communications equipment
Asahi Kasei
Japan
auto parts
Asics
Japan
shoes
Asusteck
Taiwan
computers
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Target
Country
India
Japan
Vietnam
Taiwan

Avery Dennison
Brooks Sports
Canadian National
Railway Co.
Capstone International
HK Ltd/Florida
Carrifour
Casio Computer
ChinaNetCloud
Citizen Watch
Compal Electronics

U.S.
U.S.
Canada

materials science
shoes
railways

Vietnam

U.S./Hong
Kong
France
Japan
U.S.
Japan
Taiwan

sourcing for big-box U.S. retailers

Thailand

Dell
Enphase Energy
Epson/Seiko
Foxconn

U.S.
U.S.
Japan
Taiwan

computers
solar microinverters
printing and robotics
electronics

Funai Electric
Fuyao Glass
GoerTek

Japan
China
China

TVs
auto glass
wireless earphones for Apple

GoPro
Groupe PSA
G-Tekt
HP
Inventec

U.S.
France
Japan
U.S.
Taiwan

video cameras
automobiles
auto parts
computers
Computers and electronics

Iris Ohyama
Keihin
Komatsu

Japan
Japan
Japan

fans
auto parts
construction equipment

Kyocera
Microsoft
Mitsuba
Mitsubishi Electric

Japan
U.S.
Japan
Japan

printers
software
auto parts
laser processing machines

Nidec

Japan

auto parts, home appliance parts

Nikon

Japan

image products and others

Nintendo

Japan

video game consoles

retailer
wristwatches
cloud services
wristwatches
routers, other telecom equipment
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Thailand
U.S.
Thailand
Taiwan,
other
countries
Taiwan
Mexico
U.S. and
other
countries
Mexico
U.S.
Vietnam
Mexico
Japan
Taiwan
E. Europe,
other
countries
S. Korea
Japan
Japan,
Mexico
Vietnam
U.S.
Japan
Mexico

Vietnam

Nitto

Japan

electronic devices and others

Olympus
Omron

Japan
Japan

cameras and others
precision electronics

Panasonic
Pegatron

Japan
Taiwan

stereos, other in-car equipment
telecom equipment

Ricoh
Samsung
Sharp
Skechers USA
Sony Mobile
Steve Madden

Japan
S. Korea
Japan
U.S.
Japan
U.S.

printers
IT and electronics
computers
shoes
phones, accessories
shoes

Sumitomo Heavy
Industries
Suzuki
TCL
Toshiba Machine

Japan

robot components

Cambodia
and other
countries
Japan

Japan
China
Japan

automobiles
TVs
injection molding machines

Vietnam
Japan

Universal Electronics
Walmart
An unnamed handbag
and luggage firm and
its stitch-and-sew
manufacturing clients

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

TV remotes
retailer
handbags and luggage

Thailand
India,
Vietnam
Thailand
Vietnam
India

Mexico
Vietnam

Note: Some of the companies may have closed or are considering closing part of their operations
in China.
Data source: Compiled by author from published sources42
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